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Abstract 
We analyze the after-swap mix of fixed and floating rate debt in a sample of non-financial firms, 
using hand-collected data from a window of time when derivative positions were included in 
accounting disclosures. To motivate the analyses, we present a simple theoretical model that 
highlights the special features of interest rate risk. Consistent with the theory, we find that firms 
that issue more fixed rate debt have higher liquidity ratios and lower operating income ratios. We 
also document that individual firms actively vary the proportion of their fixed rate debt to a 
strikingly high extent. There is a debate as to whether such variation should be interpreted as 
hedging or speculation. We show that the firms more actively varying their debt mix respond to 
different hedging motives than those with low activity. We then empirically motivate an 
alternative indicator of speculative activity: co-variation between ex-post profitability of 
financial decisions and operating results.  
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In this paper, we examine the association between hedging motives and the mix of fixed and 
floating rate debt in individual firms. Both types of debt present different forms of interest rate 
risk ± IORDWLQJ UDWHGHEW H[SRVHVD ILUP¶VQHWSURILWV WRYDULDEOe interest costs, while fixed rate 
debt impacts WKHILUP¶Vfuture borrowing and investment capacity through changing liability or 
leverage levels. We ask what motivates firms to choose one type of debt over another, and then 
to vary the mix over time. Can we interpret the choice of a particular mix, or the extent of its 
variation, as an indicator of risk-reducing or risk-increasing behavior by managers? We address 
these questions by analyzing a decade-long hand-collected sample that incorporates the net 
effects of interest rate swaps on the final mix of debt in the firms. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the literature on corporate risk management in 
nonfinancial firms, specifically on the subject of interest rate risk. Previous papers have found 
some evidence that the choice of borrowing in firms is not consistent with hedging motives. 
Bodnar et al. (1998) report that over half of firms responding to their survey on derivatives usage 
admitted to allowing their view of future interest rates to affect their interest rate derivative 
position (direction, size and/or timing). Faulkender (2005) finds that debt issuances by a sample 
of firms in the chemical industry may be driven by myopic market-timing objectives, rather than 
hedging motives. Chava and Purnanandam (2007) find for a cross-section of firms that the vega 
from CFOs' compensation is positively related to the proportion of floating rate debt. Chernenko 
and Faulkender (2012) study a panel of interest rate exposure data to separate out between- and 
within-firm variation, classifying the first type of variation as arising from hedging motives and 
the second as speculation. They present evidence of both hedging and speculation, as well as of 
income smoothing by managers. This complex picture is representative of the difficulty in 
pinning down firms¶PRWLYHV in the absence of a benchmark hedging rule for choosing the mix of 
debt.1 We study whether both the level and variation of the mix of fixed and floating rate debt 
                                                          
1
 Alternative explanations for interest rate choice at debt issuance include the signaling model of Guedes and 
Thompson (1995). They argue that, as expected inflation volatility increases, floating rate debt becomes a better hedge 
for the firm, making it less useful for firms to use as a signal of quality. On the other hand, Campbell (1978) and 
Santomero (1983) considered debt issuance choice from the perspective of bank liquidity dynamics. Since their 




are associated with risk management incentives through a series of tests. 
Our findings suggest that neither fixed nor floating rate debt can be unconditionally classified as 
risk increasing. In addition, we find that firms that vary their mix more than others may be doing 
so for hedging motives along a different dimension than the less active firms. This helps us to 
reconcile some of the mixed findings in the literature. 
Our work is also related to the wider literature on corporate risk management in two ways. 
Firstly, we rely on variables identified in the literature as indicators of or proxies for the strength 
RI ILUPV¶ risk management incentives. Secondly, we are guided by the emphasis on data 
collection in the literature. There is a rich literature on corporate risk management presenting 
mixed evidence on whether risk management adds value, and on which of the risk management 
theories are supported in the data. These include, among others, Nance, Smith and Smithson 
(1993), Mian (1996), Tufano (1996), Géczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Schrand and Unal 
(1998),  Haushalter (2000), Allayanis and Weston (2001), and Knopf, Nam and Thornton 
(2002). The above studies rely on survey data and/or alternative indicators of derivative usage 
(including notional values), and Aretz and Bartram (2008) discuss the complex picture of risk 
management activity that does not solely rely on derivatives. Brown (2001) and Bartram (2008) 
FRQGXFW FDVH VWXGLHV RI D VLQJOH ILUP¶V IRUHLJQ H[FKDQJH ULVN PDQDJHPent; while Adam and 
Fernando (2006) show that speculation using derivatives is profitable in the gold industry. 
Graham and Rogers (2002) recognize that the notional value of derivatives used by a firm is 
often not linked to the extent of hedging or more specifically the net exposure from derivative 
positions. This is because firms typically do not buy and sell over the counter derivatives, but 
take offsetting positions when they wish to close a position. They address this data issue by using 
net exposures from derivatives. More recently, Campello et al. (2011)  demonstrate the 
channels (financial contracting and real investment) through which hedging adds value to the 
firm. The possibility for firms to use alternative methods for managing risk is demonstrated by 
Petersen and Thiagarajan (2000) and Kim et al. (2006), and although they study other risks, this 
is particularly important for interest rate exposures. Servaes et al. (2009) also find that the impact 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the rise of liquid markets in swaps has made the choice at issuance less important when considered exclusively. 
Similarly, work cited later in the paper shows that constraints from the source of debt (bank or public) can also be 
alleviated with swaps. 
[3] 
 
of derivatives on the final interest rate mix is relatively small. 
One challenge with the data needed for tests of risk management theories has been the versatility 
of derivatives and their accounting treatment. However, for a period of transition lasting 
approximately a decade, accounting disclosure regulations offered strong incentives for firms to 
provide details about their derivative positions in footnotes to their financial statements. During 
the 1990s, companies in general reported both the face value and direction of derivative contracts 
in their annual reports, thus presenting an opportunity to collect arguably the best available data 
on firms' interest rate positions. New rules designed to bring the contracts onto the balance sheet 
then effectively altered these disclosure requirements by 2001 (see also Graham and Rogers 
2002). The development of these rules is recounted in the Appendix. We exploit this window 
created by regulatory changes to obtain our data on both interest rate derivatives and debt 
exposures. We are therefore able to overcome some of the data limitations faced in classifying 
firms, by recording their actual positions rather than derivative usage proxies. 
We first examine the mix of fixed and floating rate debt, and show that it is jointly associated 
with the nature of constraints endogenously chosen by firms. When firms have more fixed rate 
debt, they have relatively lower operating profits, but also have more liquid assets ± hence 
protecting them from decreases in interest rates that would lead to future financing constraints. 
This result is consistent with Acharya et al. (2007) and Almeida et al. (2011), who study the 
effect of future financing constraints (a motive for risk management) on joint determination of 
policies of the firm. Conversely, when firms have more floating rate debt they have higher 
operating profits. One interpretation of this association is simply that the operating profits 
cushion the firms from interest rate variations. However, this result is also consistent with 
VWUXFWXUDOPRGHOVRIWKHILUPXVHGLQGHEWSULFLQJWKDWOLQNDILUP¶VDVVHWYDOXHWRLQFHQWLYHVIRU
holding floating rate debt, on average (e.g. Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995). 
Next, we study the time series of the proportion of fixed rate debt of individual firms. The 
empirical risk management literature often assumes WKDW ILUPV¶ XQGHUO\LQJ H[SRVXUHV WR ULVN
factors imply stable target proportions for financial variables like leverage, or even the mix of 
fixed and floating rate debt. By extension, if a firm varies the mix of its debt more often than 
another, it should signify changing exposure, higher sensitivity to risk, or speculative activity. 
Chernenko and Faulkender (2012) make a significant advance in disentangling hedging and 
[4] 
 
VSHFXODWLRQ E\ XVLQJ SDQHO GDWD 7KH\ GR VR E\ DVVXPLQJ WKH H[LVWHQFH RI D VWDEOH µWDUJHW¶
proportion of fixed rate debt for each firm. We classify firms by the extent of variation of their 
proportion of fixed rate debt over time, into those that are more or less active. If being active 
implies speculative or other forms of deviation from an optimal target, we expect to find 
evidence of value destruction or lower hedging imperatives in the relatively more active firms.  
We examine the above hypotheses in turn, through a number of tests. We first examine the 
UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ ILUPV¶ FDVK IORZV DQG LQWHUHVW UDWHV :H WHVW ZKHWKHU RQ DYHUDJH WKH
interest rate exposures of active firms differs from those of less active ones. We find the 
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHDYHUDJHVHQVLWLYLWLHVRIWKHWZRJURXSV¶RSHUDWLQJSURILWVWREHVLJQLILFDQW 
and negative. Also, on average, the operating profits of active firms vary negatively with interest 
rate levels. This suggests the existence of incentives to hedge interest rate exposures in active 
firms. Next, we compare the two groups of firms on other characteristics that the literature 
considers as motives for hedging. The more active firms are smaller on average than the less 
active firms and have higher market-to-book ratios, but the two groups are not different in terms 
of investment or research and development expenditure ratios. Overall, we find no evidence that 
being active is by itself an indicator of speFXODWLYHRUµQRQ-KHGJLQJ¶EHKDYLRU 
The above analysis complements the findings of Chernenko and Faulkender (2012) on the use of 
swaps for income management to the extent that both analyses involve the identification of 
non-hedging motives. Chernenko and Faulkender focus on an ex-post approach, which implies 
that managers transfer accounting income across years when they know what their performance 
will be. 
One may wonder whether the classification between active and inactive firms is even that strong. 
An important side-effect of this analysis is that we document for the first time the high level of 
heterogeneity in the extent to which firms vary the mix of debt over time. Not only is there 
heterogeneity in this variation, the level of variation is striking. For each firm in each year of our 
eleven-year sample, we calculate the proportion of debt that is subject to fixed rates after 
accounting for interest rate swaps. We then calculate the range of this proportion over the sample 
period, i.e. the difference between the maximum and minimum proportion of fixed rate debt for 
each individual firm. The median of this range is 0.51, showing that more than half the firms 
switched between having mostly fixed rate debt and mostly floating rate debt, or vice versa.  
[5] 
 
One of the additional contributions in this paper is the application of an appropriate estimation 
methodology, considering that the proportion of fixed rate debt exposure takes values between 0 
and 1. The standard linear regression model in such a setting may lead to biased and inconsistent 
estimates (Cook et al., 2008; McCullagh and Nelder, 1989; Papke and Wooldridge, 1996), so we 
apply a beta regression instead, which is explained in Section 4. 
Having found evidence consistent with hedging motives being linked to various proxies for 
interest rate exposure choice and variation, we would still like to make an attempt at identifying 
speculation. To explore an alternative indicator for speculation, we conduct a thought experiment 
based on purely hypothetical scenarios. The question we ask is, what could we learn if we 
assumed that firms were attempting to time the market for short term gain? 
Our sample extends across varied periods of monetary policy, with sustained episodes of 
unexpectedly low and high rates, as well as shock increases and decreases in rates. This places us 
in a position to observe how often a firm increases the share of its fixed rate debt before interest 
rates go up, or reduces the share of fixed rate debt before interest rates go down.  
Capitalizing on this opportunity, we uncover an unexpected association between operating 
performance of a firm in a given year and the change in its debt mix in the previous year. This 
finding is consistent with the notion that some managers may be making correlated decisions 
across all the dimensions of the firm, not optimally, but based on their views on future interest 
rates. This possible explanation is consistent with the finding in Géczy et al. (2007) that 
managers selectively choose exposures based on their views rather than specifically setting out to 
gamble. It is also similar in spirit to that used by Beber and Fabbri (2012), who use unexplained 
changes in the size of currency derivative positions to identify speculation and associate these 
actions with behavioral attributes of managers. If this explanation is correct, it points to a 
potential proxy for identifying firms that speculate over a period of time. Speculators would have 
a higher absolute value of correlation between the following two dimensions: operating 
performance, and the financial impact of the change in the debt mix in the previous year. 
Underlying the discussion in this introduction and motivating the choice of analyses in this and 
other papers in the literature, is the issue that theory does not provide us with an optimal 
benchmark mix of fixed and floating rate debt, with which to compare the empirically observed 
mix. We began this paper with the argument that the firm trades off two different facets of 
[6] 
 
interest rate risk when it chooses the shares of fixed and floating rate debt. In order to help 
motivate our analysis further, and to link it to the theoretical developments in corporate risk 
management, we first present a simple model to characterize the form of interest rate risk in the 
next section. 
Overall, we show in this paper that the mix of fixed and floating rate debt is associated with 
future financing constraints as predicted by theory. In addition, we document striking levels of 
variation in this mix by individual firms over time. We exploit heterogeneity in the extent of 
variation to conclude that both types of firms are responding to different hedging incentives, and 
that being active does not appear to signal speculative motives. The above analyses are discussed 
in Section 4. In Section 5, by considering the association between financial choices and 
operational results, we explore a potential approach to distinguish speculators from others. We 
use Section 3 to describe and summarize the data. 
2.  Theory and further motivation for tests 
7KHRU\ RIIHUV VHYHUDO MXVWLILFDWLRQV IRU ULVN PDQDJHPHQW LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI 0RGLJOLDQL¶V DQG
0LOOHU¶VVHWXS ,QWKHSUHVHQFHRIasymmetric information (Froot et al., 1993), financial 
distress costs (Leland, 1998; Purnanandam, 2008) or agency costs (Morellec and Smith, 2007), 
firms may benefit from smoothing cash flows to avoid deadweight losses from underinvestment 
or liquidation. Independent of the source of market distortion, financing constraints arise in states 
with profitable investment opportunities, generating a motive for hedging. The effect of such 
future financial constraints is discussed in, for instance, Acharya et al. (2007) and Almeida et al. 
(2011). Other sources of risk management incentives include convex tax schedules and 
managerial concerns for their own wealth or career (Breeden and Viswanathan, 1998; DeMarzo 
and Duffie, 1991, 1995; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Stulz, 1984). Further, strategic implications of 
hedging are explored in Adam et al. (2007) and Adam and Nain (2012). In this section we 
attempt a simple characterization of the tradeoffs generated by interest rate risk assuming one or 
more of these justifications hold. 
It is clear that more than one aspect of the firm (revenues, costs, financial value in terms of future 
prospects) may be related to variations in a market variable such as the short rate. While any firm 
may be exposed to interest rate risk in this sense, the presence of debt modifies this exposure. 
For an indebted firm, potential up and down moves of interest rates also act through the debt, and 
[7] 
 
the effect depends on whether the debt is at fixed or floating rates. A decrease in the interest rate 
UDLVHVWKHYDOXHRIIL[HGUDWHGHEWDQGWKXVUHGXFHVDILUP¶VERUURZLQJFDSDFLW\FHWHULVSDULEXV
An increase in rates raises interest payments on floating rate debt, thereby directly reducing 
income and internal resources. As both fixed and floating rate debt expose the firm to the risk of 
suboptimal investment choices, a firm could be seen to opt for a mix that trades off the two 
manifestations of risk given their specific exposure. We are interested in this particular choice. In 
this section, we propose a simple framework that would help to identify the salient features of 
interest rate risk for nonfinancial firms, and place it in the context of existing risk management 
theory. 
2.1 A simple adaptable characterization of interest rate risk 
We adapt the information structure from Acharya et al. (2007) to address the fixed versus 
floating interest rate marginal decision for a firm in a simple setting. 
2.1.1 Assumptions 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
There are three dates in the model (see Figure 1).  
At t = 0, the firm takes up a project with uncertain cash flows and partly finances it with debt 
with face value d on which it must pay coupons at t = 1, 2. The debt is repaid at t = 2. At t = 1, 
the firm receives a high or low cash flow CH or CL respectively. Here, cash flow refers to the 
underlying cash flow generated by the assets of the firm, and is in an accounting sense similar to 
EBIT. Thus, the value of the assets of the firm is inextricably linked with the EBIT, in the sense 
of Goldstein et al. (2001). On the other hand, the value of equity and debt may vary according to 
other factors. Also, the one-period risk-free interest rate either rises to rH with probability p or 
falls to rL with probability (1-p). Cash flows and interest rates are correlated - the probability of a 
high cash flow in the low interest rate state mirrors that of a low cash flow in a high interest rate 
state (see Figure 1). The expression for the correlation between cash flows and interest rates is: 
 
ሺ ?ݍ െ  ?ሻට ௣ି௣మ௤ି௤మାሺଵିଶ௤ሻమሺ௣ି௣మሻ , 
which can take values between -1 and 1, as long as p is not 0 or 1. This correlation varies across 
individual firms, and in our stylized example, affects their sensitivity to each type of debt.  
[8] 
 
At t = 1, the firm has an opportunity to reinvest its residual cash flow (after paying the debt 
coupon) in the project to earn a positive NPV return s, such that it is always optimal for the firm 
to invest. The cash flow at t = 2 depends on the state at t = 1 as follows. We assume there is no 
further uncertainty in high cash flow states. In low cash flow states, however, the expected return 
from the investment is multiplied by a factor  ݔҧ ൌ ߛݔு ൅ ሺ ? െ ߛሻݔ௅ , i.e. with a probability  ? െ ߛǡ the return could be low enough to bankrupt the firm, while xH is such that (at a minimum) 
the bondholder recovers her entire repayment. We may assume thatݔҧ ൌ  ?. 
We make some further simplifying assumptions, the first of which is that the existing debt has 
absolute priority over any new debt issued (for instance, at t = 1). As stated above, coupons are 
paid on debt at both t = 1 and t = 2. If the debt is at a fixed rate, the coupon is the same in both 
periods. The coupon on the debt issued at t = 1 is the riskless rate on that date. The existence of 
default risk still implies that the debt is not issued at par. The restriction on financing comes in 
the form of limited pledgeability of assets (see Acharya et al., 2007). Only a proportion Ȝ of 
current and future cash flows may be pledged to the lender, limiting the total face value of debt 
available.  
The calculations for the various quantities in the model are in the Appendix, so that we may 
concentrate on the key implications of the model. 
2.1.1 Implications 
If the firm only issues one type of debt with face value d at time 0, and the fixed rate debt is 
issued at a rate r0, such that rL < r0 < rH, we have the following expressions for the value of the 
fixed and floating rate debt respectively: 
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JJ  (2) 
Comparing expressions in Eqn. 1 and Eqn. 2, we can see that the value of the floating rate debt 
depends on default probabilities, but is not sensitive to future realizations of the interest rate, 
whereas the fixed rate debt is in fact subject to both interest rate and default risk. 
Consider now the cash-flows to the shareholders in the firm. A firm that has borrowed at a fixed 
rate expects to receive the following cash flows at time 2: 
  > @      > @       000 11111111 rdsdrCxqpqpsdrCqppq LHH  JJ  (3) 
The cash-flows to floating-rate borrowers would be  
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JJ  (4) 
In this case, the cash flows to shareholders in the case of fixed rate debt depend on default 
probabilities and the underlying operating uncertainty, but are not affected by interest rate 
changes. However, floating rate borrowers are affected adversely, particularly in the state with 
low cash flows and high interest rates coinciding. Two states are more important than others - the 
low cash flow, low interest rate regime that affects fixed rate borrowers harshly and the low cash 
flow, high interest rate regime that hurts floating rate borrowers. 
Given the unlimited potential for returns from investing at time 1, we now consider the 
possibility that the firm may increase its investment by borrowing an additional amount. We 
know that the firm may not commit more than a proportion Ȝ of its cash balances and expected 
cash flows as collateral. Hence, in each of the four states at time 1, we can work out the 
maximum (and in this case optimal) amount of borrowing (when initial debt is fixed). For 


















The key comparison is the cost of debt ( d1/B1 ) in the low cash flow states when interest rates are 
high or low. When initial debt is fixed, we can find that 
  
































which implies that the cost of new debt for a fixed rate borrower in the low interest rate state is 
higher than when interest rates are high. On the other hand, when we consider the same 
comparison in the case of a firm holding floating rate debt, we find that the difference in the cost 
of debt is positively related to (rH ± rL). 
Similarly, in terms of debt capacity at time 1 conditional on existing senior debt with face value 
d, the borrowing capacity of floating rate borrowers is greater than fixed rate borrowers in a low 
interest rate environment and vice versa.  
The key message from this model is that the mix of fixed and floating rate debt that optimizes 
shareholder value depends on the relative size of EBIT and the relative variation in interest rates 
and the correlation between EBIT and interest rates, taking into account future investment 
opportunities (including financial frictions). This helps place the problem in the context of the 
traditional approaches to corporate risk management, 
2.1.2 Empirical guidance 
Here we assumed limited pledgeability that could arise from agency costs. These same agency 
costs can be alternatively modelled as causing external finance to be more costly and to have a 
convex cost structure. This approach is taken in Froot et al. (1993). They also guide us on how to 
optimally hedge in such a setting. The answer, which is also adopted in Faulkender (2005) is to 
smooth the underlying cash flows or the EBIT of the firm. Thus, from a practical perspective, 
risk management involves hedging to reverse the effects of correlation between operating profits 
and the variable of interest (e.g. interest rates).  
Firms may have different levels of constraints that necessitate greater or lesser hedging motives, 
and we take these variables from the literature to determine whether a particular choice along the 
fixed-floating rate debt margin is related to any of these incentives. 
To identify proxies for hedging incentives, we looked to the theoretical and empirical literature, 
[11] 
 
which speaks of the existence of growth opportunities and of financial distress costs as central 
considerations. For instance, Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985) and Froot et al. (1993) predict 
a positive relationship between these variables and hedging activity. On the other hand, Morellec 
and Smith (2007) show that large firms with low growth opportunities may also reduce risk in 
order to avoid overinvestment costs. Further, Almeida et al. (2011) show that firms with future 
financing constraints may have a negative relationship between risk-taking and leverage. These 
latter papers motivate us to retain liquidity and underlying cash flow (profitability) in the mix of 
predictors. 
3. Data on the mix of fixed and floating rate debt 
3.1. Sample selection 
The main objective of this exercise was to take advantage of the period when data on both 
interest rate derivatives and debt were available. For inclusion of a firm in the database, there had 
to be a history of its annual financial statements available from the 1990s. In order to collect a 
large enough sample, we first randomly picked companies from the S&P 500 index in 2007. This 
was purely to obtain a list of firms that had a reasonable likelihood of a financial history being 
available, and the sample is not intentionally meant to be representative of a particular group of 
firms. The financial statements were taken from EDGAR SEC filings data (typically starting 
with the fiscal year 1994), as well as the Lexis-Nexis database for the early 1990s. 100 
companies from the S&P 500 index in 2007 were picked, and their statements were read for the 
financial years 1990 through 2000. Data on their derivatives usage and debt mix were then 
collected from the footnotes to the statements.  
The industry distribution of the firms is quite varied, with 63 different 4-digit SIC categories. To 
see the distribution over 2-digit levels, please see Figure 2. 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
The choice of the sample period is dictated by developments in accounting regulations that 
created a window in time when data on debt and swaps was jointly available in a manner to 
allow interpretation of net exposures. These regulations and their impact on data availability are 




3.2. Collection of data on derivative and debt positions 
The data was collected by a team of research assistants and cross-checked at least once. We used 
mainly footnotes to the financial statements to collect data on debt and derivatives positions.  
For derivatives, we collected detailed information on all interest rate derivatives used by each 
company in each year. We searched the footnotes to the annual statements through the use of 
multiple search terms in addition to looking for certain sections of the footnotes manually to 
ensure detailed and accurate data. Our initial experience showed that searching for standard 
terms such as µswap¶, µcap¶, µfutures¶, µforward¶, µfloor¶, µcollar¶, and µhedg¶ was not sufficient as 
companies often use terms such as ³interest rate protection agreement´ and ³interest rate 
exchange agreement´ to mean the same things. In order to ensure completeness, we read through 
the sections that referred to fair value disclosures, risk management, off-balance sheet 
instruments, and debt, in addition to checking for references to these terms in the management's 
discussion section of filings. Where companies mentioned the hedging of investments as one of 
their reasons for using interest rate derivatives, we also read the section on investments. This 
distinction is important because a swap related to an investment will have precisely the opposite 
effect to that of a swap related to borrowing. We classified interest rate instruments as either 
changing the firm's exposure from floating rates to fixed rates or vice versa. By floating to fixed, 
we mean an instrument that changes the interest rate payments from a floating rate such as USD 
LIBOR to a fixed USD rate, directly or indirectly. The exposure is always seen from the point of 
view of a liability, so that an increase in interest rates is a negative development for a firm with 
floating rate exposure and a positive development if you have fixed rates instead. Similarly, a 
reduction in interest rates is good if you have floating rates and bad if you have fixed rates. We 
ignored the use of cross-currency swaps when they were being used to hedge foreign currency 
exposure unless they were clearly shown to have an effect that would fit them into one of our 
two main categories, viz. floating to fixed or fixed to floating. Although the firms declare 
investment hedging ability, they actually rarely have swaps matched to investments. This may be 
related to hedge accounting reasons, as swaps are relatively long-lived, and the firm is obliged to 
match it to a particular underlying to benefit from hedge accounting. However, it is easy to 
demonstrate either type of swap as being a hedge when it comes to debt. Firms state they are 
hedging the cost of debt when they enter into floating to fixed swaps, and the value of debt when 
they enter into fixed to floating swaps. 
[13] 
 
The level and clarity of the disclosures vary significantly across companies. Some companies 
report individual contracts, since swaps are usually on large sums and are not very frequent. 
Other companies only provide aggregate level information on the notional and fair values and the 
direction of the swaps (fixed to floating or vice versa). This latter format is sufficient for our 
purposes as long as the underlying item(s), whose exposure is being hedged, are delineated.  
Effectively, the data gives us a snapshot at the end of each year of the extent to which companies 
altered the mix of fixed and floating rate debt with the use of derivatives. After collecting 
detailed information about all the instruments in the disclosures, we aggregated the exposures 
generated by derivatives into floating to fixed or fixed to floating. Where the disclosures were 
not sufficiently clear as to assign a direction to the derivative positions, we dropped those 
companies from our sample. For instance, firms providing only the notional value, but not the 
direction of swaps, had to be dropped; as did those where merger and acquisition activity made 
data non-comparable over time. Some firms also had to be dropped because they had no 
significant debt over the period or because debt data was not clear enough to make a 
determination of exposure. As a result, we have a final sample containing 82 firms over the 
eleven-year period.  
In the case of debt data, firms typically tabulated existing debt in the footnotes to financial 
statements along with further descriptions in some cases. We also checked the balance sheet 
when information on short-term debt was not separately provided in the notes. Classification of 
exposures on debt data often involved reading forward and backwards in years to where the 
terms of debt issues were properly reported as being at fixed or floating interest rates. Some 
companies report debt interest rates after the effect of swaps, and this was taken into account to 
avoid double counting the effect of swaps while combining the numbers. 
In order to obtain the final exposure we took the proportion of debt that was at fixed rates 
(without including the effect of derivatives) and then adjusted it by the net effect of all swaps. 
We define this as the variable݌݂݅ݔ ൌ ݊݁ݐ݂݅ݔ݁݀ݎܽݐ݁ܾ݀݁ݐ ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽܾ݀݁ݐ ?  
In Figure 3, we present some observations about pfix graphically. We first present the variation 
in this proportion for individual firms (over time) and across firms (in a given year). This 
variation is also compared with that of the leverage ratio.  
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
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In Panel A of Figure 3, we see that the distribution across firms of both the proportion of fixed 
rate debt and of leverage is fairly stable from year to year (as is seen from the median, 
interquartile range and standard deviation). Then, in Panels B and C, we look at how much these 
variables fluctuated for an individual firm over time ± the picture is now strikingly different. 
Over half the firms in the sample switch between being classified as having mostly fixed rate 
debt and mostly floating rate debt, or vice versa.  
Jointly, the observations in Figure 3 present a puzzle as to the motivation for individual firms to 
vary their interest rate exposures to such an extent. Further, Panels B and C also reflect 
significant heterogeneity in how variable the debt mix is for individual firms. Why do some 
firms vary their debt mix significantly more than other firms, given that the average mix across 
firms does not change much? To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to highlight the 
extent of this seemingly idiosyncratic variation in the debt-mix of firms. 
3.3. Risk exposure indicators and other derived variables 
For an individual firm, the variability of pfix may be captured by its range or its standard 
deviation over time. In order to understand the determinants of this variation, we separate the 
firms into two groups based on the coefficient of variation of pfix: Active and Less Active.  
Firms with their coefficient of variation of pfix in the sixtieth percentile and above are classified 
as Active, while those with the coefficient of variation below the fortieth percentile are classified 
as Less Active, leaving out the middle 20% of firms to ensure the groups are sufficiently distinct 
in terms of activeness. Using the standard deviation of pfix as the classification criterion results 
in categories that have an overlap of 94%, and other results are similar. This is also the case for 
the range. The coefficient of variation, defined as the standard deviation divided by the mean, is 
more appropriate for capturing comparisons when firms have different average levels of pfix.2 
As discussed in the theory section, we collect a set of hedge incentive variables based on the 
theoretical and empirical literature. We collect data from Compustat on market value, sales, 
leverage, liquidity, research and development expense, capital expenditure, and profitability 
measures including cash flow margins and return on assets. In order to examine the channels for 
profitability better, we also include cost variables in our dataset. Market value (mv) is calculated 
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 We are grateful to a referee for this suggestion. 
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as the product of common shares outstanding in millions (csho) and share price at the close of 
the fiscal year (prcc_f) in the industrial annual Compustat file. Similarly, we have sales (sale) 
and total assets (at), leverage is total liabilities (long term debt ± dltt, plus debt in current 
liabilities - dlc) divided by total assets, while research and development expenditure (xrd) and 
capital expenditure (capx) are normalized by total assets. To avoid differences in reporting 
interpretations, when carrying out tests, we combine capital expenditure with research and 
development expenditure to form a composite measure ³FDSLWDOSOXV5	'H[SHQVHUDWLR´ZKLFK
is also normalized by assets.. For liquidity, we define the variable quick ratio as cash plus short 
term investments (che) divided by current liabilities (lct). Cash flow margins are calculated as 
operating income before depreciation (oibdp) divided by sales, and return on assets as income 
before extraordinary items (ib) divided by total assets. Market-to-book ratios are calculated as 
total assets minus common equity (ceq) plus market value, all divided by total assets. Finally, we 
also have the ratios Cost of goods sold (cogs) and Sales, General and Administrative Expense 
(xsga) both normalized by sales. To provide an overview of the firms in the data sample, we first 
calculate the average for each firm over the sample period of each of the variables. A summary 
of these averages is in Table I. 
[Insert Table I here] 
We also provide correlations across the variables in Table II. 
[Insert Table II here] 
4. Understanding the interest rate mix 
In this section, we discuss the first two exercises described in the introduction. We start by 
attempting to determine what risk exposures are associated with the proportion of fixed rate debt, 
and then study the firm-level variation of pfix over time and its association with risk management 
incentives. 
4.1. Exercise 1: How do hedging considerations affect the proportion of fixed rate debt? 
In order to answer this question, we regress the firm-year level pfix on the firm characteristics 
identified earlier. However, as pfix is a proportion, the use of a linear regression model with pfix 
as the dependent variable would lead to biased and inconsistent estimates (see, e.g., McCullagh 
and Nelder, 1989; Papke and Wooldridge, 1996; Cook et al., 2008). As a consequence, we 
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follow the strategy proposed by Smithson and Verkuilen (2006) to estimate a Beta Regression 
Model.  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to address this particular issue with a robust 
method. This involves assuming that the pfix is conditionally beta distributed with nonlinear 
submodels for both the location and dispersion parameters of the beta distribution. Such an 
approach takes account of the necessary heteroskedasticity of the data (as a bounded variable 
will have variance changing with location), and also allows us to model the precision of the 
distribution as a function of the same covariates that predict its conditional mean. It is possible to 
estimate this model in most standard statistical software ± we use the betafit package (Buis et al., 
2003) in Stata. 
While pfix is distributed along the [0,1] interval, other firm characteristics in our regression have 
a more conventional distribution shape, making this an appropriate use of the conditional beta 
regression. The model is UHSURGXFHG EHORZ IRU WKH UHDGHU¶V FRQYHQLHQFH (following Smithson 
and Verkuilen, 2006): 
Let µ be the location parameter and ĳ the dispersion parameter of a beta distribution. Further, let 
xi be a row of observations of explanatory variables, including a constant. Then,  ߤ௜ ൌ  ݁ݔ݌ሺܠ௜ߚሻ ? ൅ ݁ݔ݌ሺܠ௜ߚሻǡ ܽ݊݀߶௜ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ሺܠ௜ߛሻ 
where ȕ and Ȗ are parameter vectors. Here, µ is the expected value (or location) of the 
beta-distributed dependent variable (pfix in this case). The variance of the dependent variable is 
determined jointly by µ and ĳ, through the relation: Var(·) = µ(1 - µ)/(1 + ĳ). This means that, 
for a given level of µ, higher ĳ is associated with lower variance. 
Our empirical specification includes the same firm characteristics that are used to proxy risk 
management imperatives. As we have shown in Figure 3 above, the mean pfix for a single firm 
may carry limited information, but there is still some variation in the cross-firm average of pfix 
from year to year that may bias the results, so we also include year dummies among the 
explanatory variables. These year dummies effectively account for general market conditions. 
[Insert Table III here] 
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The results of this regression in Table III show that firms with higher profitability or operating 
cash flows tend to have a lower pfix while those with higher short-term liquidity (quick ratio) 
tend to have a higher pfix. This is consistent with the argument that financially constrained firms 
would hold more liquid reserves. The notion of constraint here is the future borrowing capacity 
of the firm. A firm with more fixed rate debt exposes itself to the risk of increased leverage, 
hence endangering borrowing capacity ± such a firm holds more cash and short-term assets as a 
hedge. On the other hand, firms with high operating cash flows would face a reduced constraint. 
In other words, we can see that the choice of issuing more fixed or floating rate debt is linked to 
other factors affecting the firm, and these change over time. Whether the choice of debt type is 
determined by the liquidity and profitability of the firm or vice versa is not of central importance 
± theory suggests that these would be jointly determined.  
From the analysis, we also see that higher leverage is associated with lower pfix. This does not 
contradict the arguments above, but may also be linked to an alternative explanation. Kahl et al. 
(2013) argue that firms tend to borrow short-term funds (such as, by issuing commercial paper) 
for the purpose of making large investments or financing acquisitions. The fact that the 
leverage-pfix relationship does not appear to hold unconditionally offers increases in short-term 
borrowing as a potential explanation.  
Higher leverage is also linked to higher dispersion in the pfix, suggesting that more extreme 
values of pfix would be seen in higher leverage firms. This conditional finding is consistent with 
the argument that firms jointly determine their exposure in consideration with a combination of 
factors and it would be inaccurate to assume an unconditional link between leverage and the 
level of pfix or its variation. Sales and quick ratio are marginally significant for the dispersion 
parameter, with higher sales reducing dispersion and a higher quick ratio increasing it. This is 
consistent with the view that not all firms are maintaining liquidity as a response to constraints, 
and some may have other motives for holding short-term assets. This would lead to more 
variability in the choice of pfix for firms with high liquidity. 
4.2. Exercise 2: Variation of pfix and risk management 
The next question in this paper is whether high variation in pfix by individual firms can be is 
linked to hedging or speculation. In this subsection, we compare the strength of hedging 
incentives between the two groups of firms. We first test for differences in the sensitivity of the 
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ILUPV¶RSHUDWLQJFDVKIORZV to interest rates. We then compare them using both univariate tests 
and multiple regression with respect to their average characteristics over the sample period. 
4.2.1. Are Active firmV¶RSHUDWLQJFDVKIORZVPRUHVHQVLWLYHWRLQWHUHVWUDWHV" 
The primary candidate for hedging motives is based on the sensitivity of the firm's underlying 
cash flows (operating profits) to interest rates, as discussed in Section 2. This theory predicts that 
the firm would try to adopt a hedge ratio that will allow it to have sufficient internal cash in case 
investment opportunities arise (see Froot et al., 1993). 
Faulkender (2005) obtains firm-by-ILUP HVWLPDWHV RI WKH µEHWDV¶ RI FDsh flows with respect to 
interest rates ± these betas could then be used to proxy for hedge ratios and determine whether 
firms should be taking on relatively more fixed or floating rate debt. Positive correlations imply 
that the firm may be partially naturally hedged against interest rates, while negative correlation 
suggests that the firm is exposed to greater interest rate risk. We would like to know if Active 
firms have cash flows more correlated to interest rates than Less Active firms. McNulty and 
Smith (1998) report a majority of the coefficient estimates for firm-by-firm regressions of cash 
flows on interest rates are statistically insignificant, although the point estimates vary between 
-16 and +20. Further, they record high serial correlation in the variables. In order to address these 
concerns, we group all firms into a single panel regression, using data over all the quarters from 
January 1989 through December 2001.3 The dependent variable is operating profits/book assets 
as in earlier papers, regressed on its own lag, LIBOR, a dummy for the Active group, and its 
interaction with LIBOR to estimate the slope differences. The inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable is clearly important given the high serial correlation in operating profits. To account for 
firm-specific characteristics, we use a fixed-effects specification. The regression results are 
presented in Table IV for the following specifications: 
ittittiiit uLIBORActiveLIBORCFCF   *321,1,0 EEEE      (1) 
Since the mean cash flow dummy would lead to collinearity in the fixed effects regression, this 
specification provides us with estimates only of the difference between the sensitivities of the 
cash flows of the Active group with that of the Less Active group. Although the fixed-effects 
                                                          
3
 In our sample too, the individual regressions lead to statistically insignificant estimates of beta in too many cases. 
This introduces a measurement error problem that is known to bias the second round regression results. 
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specification is supported by a Hausmann test, we also report a random-effects regression 
specified as 
ititiittiit uLIBORActiveActiveLIBORCFCF   DEEEEE *4321,10     (2) 
which is estimated by the Feasible Generalized Least Squares method. In both cases, we report 
p-values based on clustered (by firm), robust standard errors.  
[Insert Table IV here] 
We find that, conditional on past profits, Active ILUPV¶SURILWVYDU\QHJDWLYHO\ZLWKLQWHUHVWUDWHV
while those of Less Active firms have a marginally positive relationship with the level of LIBOR. 
The net sensitivity for Active firms is -0.089 + 0.053 = -0.036 from the fixed-effects regression, 
and similarly -0.037 from the random effects specification.  Contrary to the idea that more 
activity is a sign of speculation, these regressions suggest that Active firms have operating profits 
that are relatively more exposed to interest rate risk.  
We examine further why firms vary their interest rate mix so widely, when we compare other 
predicted characteristics for hedgers between the two categories of firms. 
4.2.2. Other risk exposure indicators and higher activity  
First we calculate the average over the entire sample period for each firm of the characteristics 
listed in Section 3.3. These averages are summarized in Table V. 
[Insert Table V here] 
In the last two columns of Table V, we report the differences in the average firm characteristics 
between the two categories of firms, i.e. Active - Less Active, with the p-values below each 
difference. The results of the univariate tests are inconclusive.  
The fact that Active firms are smaller and have higher market-to-book ratios than Less Active 
firms would theoretically point to activity as being an indicator for hedging behavior based on 
the asymmetric information (leading to costly external financing) argument. That Active firms 
have lower leverage and higher liquidity may also be consistent with this argument, but the 
actual rate of capital expenditure or research and development expenditure in Active firms is not 
different from that in Less Active firms over the eleven-year period. Perhaps the findings of 
lower leverage fit better with the overinvestment avoidance argument of Morellec and Smith 
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(2007), but then we are faced with the lower size and higher market-to-book ratios of Active 
firms as contradictions.  
Similarly, the Less Active firms can be seen to have hedging incentives from financial distress 
costs based on their higher leverage and lower liquidity. Does this imply that different types of 
hedging motives necessitate different hedging strategies? In other words, do smaller firms with 
growth options have a different policy towards interest rate risk than those that may face greater 
financial distress costs?  
Our next step is to examine the above questions using multiple regression. In Table VI, we 
present the estimates from a probit regression in which the dependent variable is 1 if the firm is 
classified as Active, and 0 otherwise. The regressors include all the firm characteristics (we drop 
market value and total assets in favor of sales as a size proxy). We use heteroskedasticity robust 
standard errors and report the p-values below the estimates. The estimates reported are not the 
raw estimates, but the marginal effects estimated at the mean of the explanatory variables.  
[Insert Table VI here] 
Most of the univariate results survive under multiple regression, still offering conflicting 
evidence for risk management theory. Firms are likely to vary their interest rate mix more when 
they have lower sales and (with a weak significance) lower leverage along with higher market to 
book ratios. Are these firms the hedgers predicted by the combined complementary arguments in 
Smith and Stulz (1985) and Morellec and Smith (2007), aiming for a target mix of debt? The 
overinvestment avoidance argument is also supported by the fact that Less Active firms have 
higher sales, general and administrative expense ratios combined with weakly higher operating 
profit marginsDSRWHQWLDOLQGLFDWRURIWKHILUPV¶UHODWLYHHIILFLHQF\ Once again, the flip side of 
the results points to smaller firms with more growth opportunities and lower leverage being 
Active ± the very firms predicted by asymmetric information considerations to be hedgers.  
To recap the findings from this section, an optimal mix of debt can only be interpreted as being 
jointly determined by other policies and exposures of the firm, and hence to be varying 
significantly for some firms over time. Thus, activity itself, or deviation from a mean level of 
fixed rate debt, is just as likely to be consistent with optimal hedging strategy as maintaining a 
constant level. It appears that Active and Less Active firms face distinct types of hedging motives. 
Active firms are smaller in size with lower leverage and higher growth opportunities, and their 
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operating profit margins are negatively associated with interest rates. As firms get bigger and 
have lower growth opportunities and higher leverage, they are Less Active, and their cash flow 
margins are not very sensitive to interest rate levels. We have found evidence that firms with 
different types of hedging incentives adopt different approaches to varying their interest rate mix. 
5. Identifying hedging or speculation 
Despite using finer proxies, we have not yet found significant evidence consistent with 
speculation by managers as reported in the survey findings cited in Section 1. We know that, 
ceteris paribus, if a firm reduces its pfix by the end of year t, and interest rates fall during year 
t+1, the firm will face a lower average interest expense in year t+1 than would have been the 
case under the (higher) pfix that prevailed at the beginning of year t. A similar outcome will arise 
from an increase in pfix in advance of a rise in interest rates. This specific marginal effect will be 
reflected in the net profit reported in the financial statement, but not in the operating profit. 
Based on this observation, we adopt a thought experiment in this section to seek any hints 
supporting the presence of market timing by managers. 
We begin by making the extreme assumption that all managers base their marginal interest rate 
choice (viz. change in pfix) on their view of future interest rates. What follows in this paragraph 
is one possible sequence of thoughts based on this extreme assumption. If this assumption were 
universally true, we could separate firms into two groups based on whether they made an ex-post 
³SURILWDEOH´FKRLFH, e.g. chose to increase pfix when interest rates rise in the following year. Let 
us call them Right and Wrong based on whether their choice at the end of year t proved to be 
³SURILWDEOH´ in year t+1, only within the confines of this thought experiment. We might then 
hypothesize that, other effects notwithstanding, the Right group would do better than the Wrong 
group on changes in financial measures in year t+1. On the other hand, one should not expect to 
observe any differences between the average changes in the operating performance of these two 
groups as it does not include interest expense. Note that under this definition, a firm could be 
classified as Right in one year, and Wrong in the next. Then over time, if firms are more often 
Right than Wrong, one could hypothesize that they would display superior value or performance 
than their counterparts, on average. 
The assumption above is clearly an extreme case and the pursuant predictions require further 
assumptions even if we were in the extreme case. For significant differences in financial 
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performance to be discerned, all firms would be trying to time the market, and also doing so at a 
one-year horizon. Decisions about financial exposures would be separated from other operating 
choices that are sensitive to interest rates. In addition, for overall firm value to be superior, even 
those firms that speculate profitably would not have operating exposures to interest rates that 
dominate the purely financial exposures. Further, the changes in interest rates (direction and/or 
size) referred to above must be unexpected, or they would be priced into a swap contract or new 
loan rates, diluting the outcomes. 
Theory casts further doubt about the conclusions from this extreme case. Even when all 
managers are assumed to be market timing and the conditions in the previous paragraph hold, 
firms should not have sustained informational advantage over others that would lead to long term 
µtiming SHUIRUPDQFH¶. 7KXVDILUP¶VFODVVLILFDWLRQLQWRWKHRight or Wrong group in a given year 
should be random. Theory would then suggest that, even in this scenario, firms that are more 
often Right will not have better value or operational characteristics. 
Now also consider the opposite extreme case. If all firms change pfix on the basis of their 
individual hedging considerations, any classification of firms along the lines above (based on the 
imagined game of speculation) should show no diIIHUHQFHV LQ ILUPV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH Finally, if 
only some firms are speculating and others hedging, then results would be mixed.  
Below, we examine the data for clues based on the above arguments. Over our sample period, 
the interest rate varied significantly and had several surprises. Figure 4 displays the development 
of the Fed Funds rate and LIBOR over the sample period, and shows (in Panel b) the direction in 
which pfix would need to change in a given year for the firm to benefit from changes in the Fed 
Funds rate the following year. Table VII contains the same information as Figure 4b. This 
interpretation only considers interest expense in the context of the current thought experiment, 
and is not a general rule. A firm is classified as Right in a particular year if it had changed its pfix 
the previous year in the same direction as stated in Table VII, and Wrong otherwise. 
5.1.  Question 1: Do firms that appear to anticipate rates more often display any advantages 
RYHUWKRVHWKDWGRQ¶W" 
As noted above, a firm could be Right in one year and Wrong the next. To determine whether a 
firm was Right more often, we take the average of Right (which is a binary variable) for each 
firm over 10 years. Firms that were in the 60th percentile or higher of being Right on average are 
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labeled AllRight, and those that were in the 40th percentile or below are the other group. The 
distribution of the variable AllRight across firms is provided in Figure 5. Similarly, the 
proportion of firms that were Right in any given year is provided in Figure 6. This proportion is 
between 40% and 60% in any single year, so that firms were evenly distributed between the two 
categories although the composition of each group was not the same from year to year. 
[Insert Figure 4, Table VII, Figure 5 and Figure 6 here] 
We now run a probit regression to check if there is any feature of a firm that would predict that it 
is more likely to belong to the AllRight group. Resoundingly, none of the characteristics (size, 
profitability, liquidity, cost management) have a significant coefficient. If we had found any 
significant association, it might point to an explanation for firms being more often Right (such as 
informational advantage due to size), or to evidence that those that are more often Right have 
some performance differences from their counterparts. Such evidence might have been consistent 
with the extreme assumption in our thought experiment that all firms are speculating, and might 
also have led us to explore questions of managerial ability. As such, we have found no 
significant evidence to lead us in this direction. On the other hand, the two potential alternatives 
we identified above cannot be ruled out. Firms could be speculating but with no sustainable 
informational advantage, or they are not speculating and in fact choosing pfix based on other 
considerations, such as those we found in Section 4. There may be other alternatives we have not 
explored. Next, we consider the year-by-year classification. 
5.2. Question 2: Are there differences between Right and Wrong firms year-by-year?  
When pfix choices are made on hedging considerations, the classification into Right and Wrong 
on a year-by-year basis should be effectively artificial, and we would not expect any evidence of 
differences in performance between the two groups of firms in a given year. To test this 
argument, we pool all firm-year observations of Right and Wrong, and compare the two groups 
using t-tests on various measures of their annual change in performance. We find that there are 
significant differences between Right and Wrong firms.  
[Insert Table VIII here] 
The results in Table VIII show that in the year following a Right move, firms were better off 
compared to their Wrong counterparts due to reduced leverage and superior operating 
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performance through lower sales, general and administrative expenses. Finally, they had to issue 
relatively less short-term debt in that year.4 It is difficult to imagine causation from interest rate 
decisions to any of the above performance measures, more so because the change in return on 
assets is not significantly different between the two sets of firm-years, but the change in 
operating cash flow (which does not take into account the interest expense) is better in Right 
firms.  
One possible explanation for this positive relation is that managers may take a view on future 
developments in the economy and act on them across the activities of the firm, not just in terms 
of their interest rate choices. There is empirical evidence in support of the idea that managers 
make operational changes in response to what they view as changes in exposure (Aabo and 
Simkins, 2005). If some managers also make such changes based on their views on future 
interest rate changes, we would expect to see the result in Table VIII. However, combined with 
the result in Section 5.1, the differences between Right and Wrong firms cannot be attributed to 
skill, but potentially to luck. In other words, it is possible that when managers guess the direction 
of the economy correctly, they may make coordinated decisions that give them a short-term 
advantage in their operational performance as well. 
While we cannot consider this to be evidence of speculation, we do see results consistent with 
the possibility that some managers act on their views when they choose their mix of fixed and 
floating rate debt. We have also seen that, in the case of interest rates, hedging or speculative 
behavior is too complex to be captured by a simple proxy such as active swaps usage, or even the 
level of variation in the share of fixed rate debt. The results in this section point to possible 
further exploration of alternative indicators of speculation based on the correlation over time 
between operational results and ex post outcomes of financial choices such as changes in pfix. 
Several caveats have been identified at the beginning of this Section. Other caveats exist. For 
instance, firms could change their policies over time. Alternatively, they could be acting over a 
different horizon. To the extent that the data has offered a clue, it supports the existence of at 
least some behavior consistent with findings such as those in Geczy et al. (2007) or Aabo and 
Simkins (2005). A fuller consideration of the caveats discussed above, and of the potential for 
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 A referee has pointed out that the average LIBOR did not change significantly in some years. In order to check for 
robustness, we have also carried out this classification exercise in only three years identified as containing significant 
interest rate surprises: the 1994 and 1998 tightening, and the 2001 easing. The results with respect to operating 
performance remain similar, though the difference in leverage is no longer significant. 
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constructing new indicators of speculation based on the findings in this Section is left to future 
work. 
6. Conclusion 
We have studied the proportion of fixed rate debt in firms by using hand-collected data from a 
specific period of time when this type of data retrieval is informative. Our analysis reconciles 
some of the mixed results in the literature and extends it by considering a further refinement of 
data to identify the existence of different hedging motives in firms that vary their interest rate 
mix to a lesser or greater extent. We also document the nature and striking level of variation in 
the proportion of fixed rate for individual firms over time.  
We also contribute by proposing a further method to identify speculative activity by firms. We 
have shown how both simple and sophisticated attempts at classifying a particular position as 
speculative or a hedge could fail when we do not take other operational information into account.  
We find evidence consistent with Almeida et al. (2011), whereby firms with lower leverage and 
potential financing constraints are seen to be actively hedging their exposures. While firms with 
high leverage and more fixed rate debt retain more liquidity, those with lower leverage and more 
floating rate debt tend to have higher operating cash flows.  
Several questions still remain. The fact that the mean across firms of pfix is relatively stable 
suggests that the demand and supply effects transmitted through the financial intermediary sector 
are playing a role. This argument is developed in the context of the maturity choice by 
Greenwood, Hanson and Stein (2010).  
We found that Active firms and those that are more often Wrong are not less valuable than their 
counterparts on average. The implications of this for discriminating between ex-ante and ex-post 
income smoothing require further study. 
The results in this paper are particularly relevant to the two-sided nature of interest rate risk and 
may not be straightforward to apply to other sources of financial market risk. We have also 
presented a simple framework that moves towards establishing a benchmark rule for the optimal 
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Details of model solution 
Consider first an exogenously determined debt with face value d that the firm has issued at time 
0. If the firm issues only fixed rate debt at a rate r0, such that rL < r0 < rH, the time 0 value of debt 
based on no further borrowing would be given by: 
       
        
          











































































































































with productivity parameters:  

















Also, given that any investment at time 1 promises a higher expected return than the riskless 
discount rate, we can conclude that the risk-neutral agent will invest the maximum available 
funds at time 1. Thus, I** will always be C* - dr0 in any state *, and we don't need to calculate I 
for the above comparison. 
Simplifying this expression leads to  
  
     

















































If the firm had taken only a floating rate loan, the loan's market value at time 0 would similarly 
[31] 
 
be given by 
  
     















































Consider now the cash-flows to the shareholders in the firm. For our comparisons, we can make 
the further simplifying assumption that the low cash flow state at time 2 is a default state in that 
it doesn't cover the debt repayment completely. In such a case, a firm that has borrowed at a 
fixed rate expects to receive the following cash flows at time 2: 
  > @      > @       000 11111111 rdsdrCxqpqpsdrCqppq LHH  JJ  
The cash-flows to floating-rate borrowers would be  
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In this case, the cash flows to shareholders in the case of fixed rate debt depend on default 
probabilities and the underlying operating uncertainty, but are not affected by interest rate 
changes. However, floating rate borrowers are affected adversely, particularly in the state with 
low cash flows and high interest rates coinciding.  
Given the unlimited potential for returns from investing at time 1, we now consider the 
possibility that the firm may increase its investment by borrowing an additional amount (there is 
no repayment option to reduce time 0 debt balances at time 1). We know that the firm may not 
commit more than a proportion Ȝ of its cash balances and expected cash flows as collateral. 
Hence, in each of the four states at time 1, the maximum (and in this case optimal) amount of 

































In the case of a low cash flow, we need to solve the following system of equations to find the 
value of borrowing possible 
 
       
































The solution to this is 
  









where  ݔҧ ൌ ߛݔு ൅ ሺ ? െ ߛሻݔ௅  and തܺ ൌ ߛߣݔҧ ൅ ሺ ? െ ߛሻݔ௅. The calculations in the case of low 
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The key comparison is the cost of debt ( d1/B1 ) in the low cash flow states when interest rates are 
high or low. We can show that 
  
































which implies that the cost of new debt for a fixed rate borrower in the low interest rate state is 
[33] 
 
higher than when interest rates are high. On the other hand, when we consider the same 
comparison in the case of a firm holding floating rate debt, we find that the difference in the cost 
of debt is positively related to (rH ± rL), 


























































































Finally, taking into account the additional issue of debt d1 at time 1, we can now recalculate the 
value of time 0 debt. The fixed rate debt would be valued as: 
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If the debt were issued at a floating rate, 
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Evolution of accounting standards for reporting derivatives 
As the use of derivatives increased in the 1980s, accounting regulations evolved in response, 
thereby providing a window of time when we could learn about the directional exposure of firms 
to interest rates. In this appendix, we recount how off-balance sheet instruments were reported in 
the footnotes of firms' financial statements as a result of a series of accounting regulations.  
In December 1989, the Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued the Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 104 (FAS104) that amended FAS95 (November 1987) to 
allow for hedge based accounting classification of derivatives as long as the accounting policy 
was disclosed. Hedge-based accounting classification refers to the practice of assigning 
derivatives based cash flows to the same category as an identifiable underlying. Under the 
original FAS95, such transactions were required to be classified according to the nature of the 
cash flows, and not under the headings of the items being hedged. The Statement was made 
effective for financial years ending after June 15, 1990. 
FAS95 was followed by FAS105 in March 1990 which was entitled: Disclosure of Information 
about Financial Instruments with Off-Balance-Sheet Risk and Financial Instruments with 
Concentrations of Credit Risks. FAS105 was introduced as a first step toward a general system 
of reporting financial instruments whose usage and variety was steadily increasing. It required 
fuller disclosure by corporations about their off-balance sheet financial transactions that included 
the notional principal accompanied by information/discussions about the applicable market and 
credit risk. FAS105 was also applicable for financial years ending after June 15, 1990 and has 
since been superseded by a series of other statements beginning with FAS107 (Disclosures about 
Fair Value of Financial Instruments) that was issued in December 1991. FAS107 mainly had the 
impact of extending and generalizing the applicability of FAS105 and it was applicable for 
financial years ending after December 15, 1992. 
In October 1994, the FASB issued FAS119: Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments 
and Fair Value of Financial Instruments, which would be effective for financial statements 
ending December 15, 1994 (see footnote 11). This statement extended the applicability of 
disclosure requirements to instruments that did not have market risk, required identification of 
instruments held for trading purposes, and specified further classification of instruments, while 
encouraging but not requiring increased quantitative disclosures. Thus, during the period 
[36] 
 
beginning in 1990, companies disclosed more information about their actual derivatives positions 
in the footnotes to their annual financial statements. 
The propensity to provide quantitative and transparent information about the actual positions in 
swaps was reduced after 1999, when FAS133 (Accounting for Derivative Instruments and 
Hedging Activities) was initially set to come into effect. FAS133 was deferred by a year to 2000 
under FAS137. FAS133 and subsequent statements laid down rules for an accounting treatment 
of derivatives that would incorporate them into the balance sheet (and earnings statements). They 
also removed the emphasis on provision of specific position information in the footnotes as long 
as risk management methods and accounting policies were clearly enunciated. Thus, the period 
offering distinct information on the companies' derivative transactions ended around 2000. 
Despite requiring or incentivizing disclosure between 1990 and 2000, the FASB rules were 
neither very prescriptive, nor very strict. This has allowed for a wide range of terminology and 
detail in disclosure. For instance, both a floating to fixed swap and a fixed to floating swap could 
qualify for hedge accounting as long as they were sufficiently matched to some underlying debt. 
In the former case, it might be claimed that interest payments were being hedged, while in the 




Tables and Figures 
Table I: Descriptive Statistics on Average Firm Characteristics 
We summarize the firm characteristics used in the analysis. Each characteristic is calculated as 
the average over eleven years for the particular firm. 6DOHVLVLWHP³VDOH´IURPWKH&RPSXVWDW
,QGXVWULDO$QQXDOILOH7RWDO$VVHWVLV³DW´ZKLOH0DUNHW9DOXHLVGHILQHGDVWKHSURGXFWRI
common shares outstanding in millions (csho) and share price at the close of the fiscal year 
SUFFBI/HYHUDJHLVWRWDOOLDELOLWLHVWRWDODVVHWVFDOFXODWHGDVWKHVXPRI³GOWW´DQG³GOF´GLYLGHG
E\³DW´5HVHDUFKDQGGHYHORSPHQWH[SHQVHUDWLRLVFRPSXWHGDV³[UG´GLYLGHGEy total assets 
DQGFDSLWDOH[SHQGLWXUHUDWLRLV³FDS[´VLPLODUO\QRUPDOL]HG4XLFNUDWLRLVGHILQHGDVFDVKDQG
short term investments (che) divided by current liabilities (lct). Cash flow margins are calculated 
as operating income before depreciation (oibdp) divided by sales, return on assets as income 
before extraordinary items (ib) divided by total assets, market to book ratio as the sum of total 
assets less common equity (ceq) and market value of equity together divided by total assets. The 
two cost ratios are Cost of goods sold (cogs) and S, G & A expense (xsga), each divided by sales. 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Sales 82 9641 9924 340 54268
Total assets 82 10181 9868 732 56640
Market value of Equity 82 14261 19943 1053 96431
Leverage 82 0.283 0.118 0.060 0.618
Share of long term debt 82 0.796 0.157 0.215 0.995
Quick ratio 79 0.423 1.554 0.014 13.78
R & D expense ratio 82 0.025 0.037 0.000 0.168
Capital expenditure ratio 82 0.070 0.039 0.000 0.205
Cash flow margin 82 0.197 0.111 0.036 0.637
Return on assets 82 0.061 0.041 -0.002 0.187
Asset turnover 82 1.079 0.611 0.175 3.857
Market to book ratio 82 2.073 1.101 1.023 8.021
Cost of Goods Sold 82 0.617 0.168 0.106 0.921
Sales, General & Admin Expense 72 0.215 0.116 0.030 0.526
[38] 
 
Table II: Pairwise correlations of the variables in the paper 
 
Sales Total assets M.V. of Equity Leverage Quick ratio R & D expense Cash flow margin Return on assets Asset turnover Market to book Cost of Goods Sold S, G & A Expense
Total assets 0.85
significance p-value 0.000
Market value of Equity 0.59 0.66
significance p-value 0.000 0.000
Leverage -0.19 -0.05 -0.33
significance p-value 0.084 0.633 0.003
Quick ratio -0.09 -0.05 0.29 -0.34
significance p-value 0.454 0.662 0.012 0.002
R & D expense ratio 0.03 0.03 0.35 -0.51 0.51
significance p-value 0.791 0.795 0.001 0.000 0.000
Cash flow margin -0.23 0.03 0.22 0.17 0.31 0.09
significance p-value 0.036 0.768 0.052 0.132 0.006 0.407
Return on assets 0.05 -0.01 0.52 -0.39 0.35 0.31 0.32
significance p-value 0.656 0.933 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.003
Asset turnover 0.26 -0.18 -0.06 -0.34 -0.14 -0.07 -0.64 0.16
significance p-value 0.019 0.116 0.578 0.002 0.226 0.543 0.000 0.165
Market to book ratio -0.01 -0.07 0.51 -0.34 0.47 0.49 0.32 0.83 0.10
significance p-value 0.897 0.561 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.372
Cost of Goods Sold 0.20 0.08 -0.32 0.08 -0.38 -0.45 -0.63 -0.59 0.32 -0.65
significance p-value 0.072 0.471 0.003 0.499 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000
S, G & A Expense -0.17 -0.14 0.22 -0.20 0.26 0.45 0.13 0.48 -0.06 0.55 -0.77
significance p-value 0.158 0.240 0.067 0.100 0.035 0.000 0.262 0.000 0.592 0.000 0.000
Active -0.28 -0.28 0.15 -0.19 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.33 0.04 0.42 -0.24 0.16
significance p-value 0.023 0.024 0.224 0.135 0.148 0.148 0.110 0.007 0.733 0.000 0.051 0.221
[39] 
 
Table III: The relationship between pfix and firm characteristics 
We report the results of a beta regression of pfix on a range of firm characteristics. p-values 
based on robust standard errors (sandwich estimator) for the location and precision parameters of 
the beta distribution are reported, along with the marginal effects at the mean of the explanatory 
variables. The estimates in bold script are statistically significant at the 5% level. The variable 
³Capital plus R&D expense ratio´ combines capital expenditure and research and development 
expenditure, normalized by total assets. 
 
  
Estimate p-value Estimate p-value Estimate Std. Error
Constant 1.36 0.000 1.92 0.000
Sales 0.00 0.257 0.01 0.051 0.001 0.001
Leverage -1.19 0.010 -1.20 0.008 -0.271 0.115
Quick ratio 0.41 0.007 -0.34 0.066 0.093 0.033
Cash flow margin -2.95 0.017 -0.75 0.406 -0.672 0.326
Return on assets 0.12 0.909 -1.59 0.158 0.028 0.240
Capital plus R & D expense ratio -0.32 0.752 0.64 0.508 -0.073 0.233
Market to book ratio -0.07 0.212 -0.03 0.480 -0.016 0.013
Asset turnover 0.08 0.491 -0.08 0.580 0.018 0.025
S, G & A Expense 0.02 0.963 -1.41 0.006 0.006 0.118
Term yield -0.39 0.212 -0.93 0.010 -0.089 0.084
Year effects
Number of observations 674
Wald chi2(19) 77
Prob > chi2 0




Table IV: Operating profit (normalized by assets) and the level of pfix variation 
We regress firm cash flows on interest rates, based on whether the firms are classified as Active 
interest rate managers. The dependent variable is operating income before depreciation divided 
by book assets. The data frequency is quarterly in a panel format, with a dummy for Active and 
its interaction term with LIBOR used to determine, if on average, the cash flows and their 
sensitivities to interest rates are different from the Less Active group. p-values based on clustered 
standard errors (by firm), robust to heteroskedasticity are provided below the estimates. 
  











No. of observations 2894 2894





Joint test 211.92 13.64
Joint test statistic Wald(4) F(3,64)
Prob>chi2, F resp. 0.0000 0.0000
[41] 
 
Table V: Characteristics of Active and Less Active firms 
We report the mean and median of firm characteristics for the entire sample and for the two 
categories of firms based on their interest rate exposure variability. Active firms have a 
coefficient of variation of the proportion of fixed rate debt (over the 11-year sample) that 
exceeds the 60th percentile of this measure across firms, and Less Active firms are those with the 
coefficient of variation of pfix below the 40th percentile. The last two columns to the right 
contain differences between the means and medians of the two categories and p-values of t-tests 
and rank-sum tests respectively. The p-values below 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
 
All Active Less Active Difference p-value
Sales Mean 9917 7626 13476 -5849 0.024
Median 6110 5283 8044 -2760 0.042
Total assets Mean 10356 7756 13243 -5488 0.025
Median 6536 4988 11411 -6423 0.015
Market value of Equity Mean 15013 19863 12998 6864 0.225
Median 7539 9780 8340 1440 0.715
Leverage Mean 0.282 0.254 0.298 -0.044 0.135
Median 0.264 0.240 0.305 -0.065 0.074
Long term debt share Mean 0.796 0.738 0.834 -0.096 0.018
Median 0.830 0.761 0.871 -0.110 0.074
Quick ratio Mean 0.252 0.315 0.189 0.125 0.146
Median 0.149 0.169 0.106 0.063 0.076
R & D expense ratio Mean 0.025 0.033 0.020 0.014 0.149
Median 0.008 0.013 0.006 0.007 0.679
Cash flow margin Mean 0.197 0.213 0.171 0.041 0.110
Median 0.171 0.200 0.161 0.039 0.207
Return on assets Mean 0.061 0.079 0.050 0.029 0.007
Median 0.051 0.069 0.041 0.028 0.011
Asset turnover Mean 1.083 1.157 1.103 0.054 0.733
Median 0.972 1.006 1.008 -0.003 0.744
Capital expenditure ratio Mean 0.068 0.071 0.064 0.007 0.425
Median 0.061 0.063 0.059 0.004 0.668
Market to book ratio Mean 2.115 2.707 1.672 1.035 0.001
Median 1.833 2.242 1.513 0.729 0.000
Cost of Goods Sold Mean 0.615 0.569 0.649 -0.080 0.051
Median 0.626 0.550 0.653 -0.103 0.054
S, G & A Expense Mean 0.216 0.243 0.205 0.038 0.220
Median 0.204 0.240 0.184 0.055 0.214
[42] 
 
Table VI: Which firms are likely to be Active? 
We report results of probit regression analysis based on the average characteristics of the firms 
over the entire sample period. Please see Table I for a description of the variables. Coefficients 











Capital plus R & D expense ratio 0.30
p-value 0.872
Cash flow margin 1.37
p-value 0.539




Market to book ratio 0.514
p-value 0.010






Table VII: Profiting from changes in pfix 
We list the strategy at the end of each year that would have been ex-post profitable in the 
following year. A negative change in pfix is profitable in most years except 1993, 1996, 1998 
and 1999. In order to determine the appropriate strategy, we compare the rate at the end of a year 
with the average rate over the following year and the rate at the end of the following year. See 









1989 8.375 8.278 float
1990 7.520 5.984 float
1991 4.219 3.830 float
1992 3.479 3.305 float
1993 3.375 4.751 fix
1994 6.500 6.038 float
1995 5.626 5.514 float
1996 5.563 5.743 fix
1997 5.835 5.559 float
1998 5.141 5.416 fix
1999 6.004 6.536 fix
2000 6.364 3.777 float
[44] 
 
Table VIII: Advantages to being Right 
We compare the change in operational characteristics and financial results in the year following 
the change in pfix based on whether the change was classified as Right. We then test if 
measurements of the Right and Wrong groups (classified year by year and then pooled together) 
are different. p-values from t-tests with unequal variances are provided below the differences. 




% ȴ Sales % ȴ Total Assets % ȴ Market 
Value of Equity
ȴ Leverage ȴ Quick ratio ȴ Cash flow 
margin
Total 0.128 0.160 0.215 0.004 0.004 0.0014
Right 0.122 0.134 0.195 -0.002 0.002 0.0036
Wrong 0.134 0.160 0.237 0.010 0.006 -0.0011
Right-Wrong -0.012 -0.026 -0.043 -0.012 -0.004 0.005
p-Value 0.744 0.426 0.501 0.014 0.824 0.0853
ȴ Return on 
Assets
ȴ Asset turnover ȴ Market to 
Book ratio
ȴ Cost of Goods 
Sold ratio




Total -0.001 -0.012 0.025 -5.37E-04 -0.001 64.774
Right 0.002 -0.005 0.022 -3.77E-04 -0.003 3.914
Wrong -0.005 -0.019 0.028 -7.13E-04 0.002 131.895
Right-Wrong 0.007 0.013 -0.006 3.35E-04 -0.005 -127.981
p-Value 0.104 0.317 0.917 0.902 0.010 0.0174
[45] 
 






Figure 2: Industry distribution of firms by 2-digit SIC code 
The firms in the sample belong to 63 different 4-digit SIC categories. We report a frequency 
chart below, aggregating the firms at the 2-digit level. At the 2-digit level, there is still 





13: Oil and Gas Extraction
15: Building Construction General Contractors and Operative Builders
20: Food and Kindred Products
21: Tobacco Products
24: Lumber and Wood Products, except Furniture
26: Paper and Allied Products
27: Printing, Publishing, and Allied Industries
28: Chemicals and Allied Products
29: Petroleum Refining and Related Industries
30: Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics Products
33: Primary Metal Industries
34: Fabricated Metal Products, except Machinery and Transportation Equipment




39: Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries
40: Railroad Transportation
48: Communications
49: Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services
50: Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods
51: Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods
52: Retail Trade
53: General Merchandise Stores
56: Apparel and Accessory Stores
57: Home Furniture, Furnishings, and Equipment Stores
67: Real Estate Investment Trusts
70: Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and other Lodging Places
73: Business Services




Figure 3: Variation in proportion of fixed rate debt (pfix) and leverage 
This figure consists of three panels. In Panel A, we show that the distributions across firms of the 
SURSRUWLRQRIHDFKILUP¶VGHEWWKDWLVVXEMHFWWRIL[HGUDWHVDQGWKHLUOHYHUDJHDUHIDLUO\VWDEOH 
A. Cross-sectional (across firms) variation over time in pfix 
The solid line represents the median across companies in each year, while the shaded region is 
the inter-quartile range around the median. The columns at the base of the chart represent the 
standard deviation across firms in each year.  
pfix      Leverage 
 
B. Distribution of time series variation for individual firms 
For each firm, we calculate the range (max - min) of pfix and leverage, respectively, in the 
eleven-year sample period. We then plot a histogram of this range for the cross-section of firms. 
The median of this sample for pfix is 0.51, and for leverage is 0.19.  




































Range (Max-Min over sample period) of share of fixed rate 





















C. Histogram: Standard deviation of leverage and of pfix for each firm 
For comparability, we present the cross-sectional distributions for the variability in firms' interest 
rate exposures and their leverage over the eleven-year sample period. For each firm, we calculate 
the standard deviation of pfix and leverage over the eleven-year sample period. We then plot the 























Figure 4: Interest rate variation 
a. Fed Funds and LIBOR rate over the sample period 
We plot the Fed Funds policy rate and the three-month LIBOR over the period January 1990 
through December 2001. The shaded bars represent the two NBER recessions during the period. 
The correlation between the two rates is over 0.98. 
 
b. Change in position that would be ex-post profitable 
Move to fixed =1; Move to floating = -1  
If a firm changed the proportion of its debt in the direction indicated in the graphs at the end of 
the respective year, it would benefit the following year by paying a lower interest rate than it 
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 Figure 5: Histogram: Success rate of individual firms 
We calculate the success rate of firms as the proportion of years in which they make an ex-post 
profitable change to the proportion of fixed rate debt. One firm made only one change in ten that 
would have reduced, ceteris paribus, its cost of debt. Three firms guessed right in all ten years (if 


















Figure 6: Proportion of firms that were Right, by year 
We plot the proportion of firms in our sample that, in any given year, changed the proportion of 
their fixed rate debt in a direction that would reflect an ex-post profit in the following year. The 
share hovers around 50%, which is not surprising given that the average pfix across firms does 
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